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EPISTEMIC PEER CONFLICT AND RELIGIOUS 
BELIEF: A REPLY TO BASINGER 
Jerome I. Gellman 
David Basinger has defended his position on the epistemology of religious 
diversity against a critique I wrote of it in this journal. Basinger endorses the 
principle that in the face of pervasive epistemic peer conflict a person has a 
prima facie duty to try to adjudicate the conflict. He defends this position 
against my claim that religious belief can be non-culpably "rock bottom" and 
thus escape "Basinger's Rule." Here I show why Basinger's defense against my 
critique is not satisfactory, and I argue against accepting Basinger's Rule. 
In a previous article of mine in this journal, I presented a critique of 
David Basinger's view of the epistemology of religious diversity.! Now 
Basinger has replied to that critique by claiming that I misunderstood 
his position.2 As a result, he says, most of what I wrote was not relevant. 
In addition Basinger provides a reply to the part of my critique that he 
thinks was relevant. 
I hereby admit that, for whatever reason, I did not present Basinger's 
position correctly. For that I apologize. However, now that I understand 
Basinger correctly (I hope), I see there remains a clear difference 
between us in the ways we approach the epistemology of religious 
diversity. It is this difference that I want to clarify here. 
In my article I defined a "rule epistemology" as one whose judgments 
were guided solely by reference to rules, where a rule is "a(n implicitly 
or explicitly) universal1y quantified proposition which states under what 
conditions one is justified in taking a proposition as true, or in believing 
it, or in taking it to be rational to believe it; or which sets out one's epis-
temic obligations with regard to one's given epistemic situation."3 I then 
argued that at least some religious believers subscribe to a different epis-
temological conception. I could put the same point by saying that at 
least some religious people have a partly different conception of rational-
ity than do others. They have what I called a "religious epistemology," 
which recognizes more than rules. Their epistemology includes religious 
propositions that are rock-bottom, where a rule or proposition is rock-bot-
tom when it helps determine the acceptability of belief candidates while 
it itself is not subject to deeper epistemic justification. A religious belief, 
I contended, could be rock-bottom and serve an epistemological role 
akin to that of rules, by, for example, requiring the rejection of any 
proposition inconsistent with it. 
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I further claimed that for some religious believers, at least, a religious 
belief enjoys strong priority in a religious epistemology, meaning that its 
acceptance is prior to considerations of rules of rationality. A belief or 
rule p is epistemically prior in my epistemic hierarchy than q when I 
accept the application of p regardless of the results of applying q, where, 
that is, I do not allow the results of applying q to change my mind about 
accepting the result of applying p. (I "apply" a belief when, for example, 
I invoke it to disqualify propositions inconsistent with it.) P is strongly 
prior for me when it is for me prior to rules of rationality. Another way 
to put this would be to say that p participates in the enterprise of judg-
ing what is rational, and is itself not subject to being so judged. For some 
believers, I contended, some religious belief, R, could be strongly prior 
in their epistemology.4 
My goal was to defend the legitimacy of religious exclusivism in the 
face of religious diversity. The idea is that the believer could invoke her 
belief as epistemically strongly prior and thus avoid an obligation to 
abandon, suspend, or question her belief in the face of that diversity. In 
particular I argued that the epistemic situation as regards the clash 
between a rule-epistemology and a religious epistemology was exactly 
the same as that between different religions. So if religious diversity was 
really a problem then so was epistemological diversity, and if one may 
not be a religious exclusivist, one may not be an epistemological "exclu-
sivist" (recognizing only rules) either. So rule epistemology could not 
defeat religious exclusivism. 
In my article I leveled criticism at Basinger as an anti-exclusivist. I 
attributed to him the view that in the face of religious diversity unless 
one could come up with evidence favoring one's own beliefs, one's 
beliefs were "epistemically defective." I also wrote that Basinger thought 
it was not rational to believe without evidence or without relying on 
one's natural faculties. I then went on to counter Basinger with my view 
of what I was calling "religious epistemology." 
This was a mistake. Basinger's real position is this: if the theist has the 
goal of maximizing truth and avoiding error, then when faced with reli-
gious diversity, she is under a prima facie obligation to try to resolve the 
conflict before deciding finally about the epistemic status of her belief. If 
the theist does not attempt to meet this obligation, she is in violation of 
her epistemic duty. If after trying to find evidence for and against her 
religious belief the theist finds none, she may continue in her belief if she 
feels that it best organizes and explains the relevant parts of reality. 
Thus, Basinger holds that a religious belief can be epistemically legiti-
mate even if a believer does not have evidence in its favor relative to 
conflicting religious beliefs and is not relying on her natural "religious 
faculty" for forming beliefs, but relying instead on what seems to her to 
best organize and explain the facts. If, however, a theist does not at least 
try to adjudicate the conflict by seeking evidence, she violates an epis-
temic obligation. 
Basinger thus rejects the "pluralist" contention that a person may not 
be an exclusivist in the face of religious diversity, as well as the "reform-
epistemologist" position that in the face of such diversity a believer need 
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engage only in "negative apologetics," that is, need only engage in turn-
ing back defeaters to her belief, but has no obligation, even prima facie, 
to seek positive evidence that favors her belief. So Basinger is no anti-
exclusivist. 
Nevertheless, Basinger and I continue to disagree. According to 
Basinger if the theist dedicates herself to maximizing truth and avoiding 
error, then in order to fulfill her epistemic obligations she must at least 
attempt to resolve significant "epistemic peer conflict." Let's call this 
"Basinger's Rule." So she must attempt to resolve the pervasive epis-
temic conflict of religious diversity. On my view as presented in the ear-
lier paper, on the other hand, a religious person can non-culpably think 
of her belief as epistemically prior to all rules of rationality including 
Basinger's Rule, and determine that she need not attempt to resolve the 
conflict, because her belief is rock bottom and strongly prior. 
In his reply to me, Basinger argues against my position as follows: if 
we assume that the theist is dedicated to maximizing truth and avoiding 
error, then there follows that at least one rule of rationality is epistemi-
cally prior to one's religious belief, namely the rule that one's beliefs be 
self-consistent. Let's call this the "Consistency Rule." As Basinger puts it: 
While there may have been ... some individuals who have actually 
believed ... that their religious beliefs need not be self-consistent, I 
deny that anyone who wishes to maximize truth and avoid error 
could actually affirm this position."s 
Basinger continues: 
I do not see how Gellman (or anyone) could argue convincingly 
that a truth-seeking believer is not required to avoid simultaneous 
affirmation of beliefs acknowledged to be inconsistent.6 
Hence, he says: 
I do not consider Gellman's claim that justified, rock bottom reli-
gious beliefs need not satisfy any rules of rationality to be defensi-
ble and thus a valid challenge to my position.7 
I cannot, it seems, affirm that religious belief could be epistemically 
prior to all rules of rationality. It cannot be prior to the Consistency Rule, 
in particular. If so, then other rules of rationality also might be epistemi-
cally prior to religious belief. In particular Basinger's Rule might be. 
Since I must in any case deny the strong priority of religious belief the 
rug is pulled out from under my defense of religious epistemology. 
That is Basinger's argument. In response, I begin by endorsing the 
dictum that "One should maximize truth and avoid error." Let's call this 
the "Golden Rule of Epistemology" or "GRE." GRE deserves a more 
careful formulation, though. I doubt there is a categorical, universal 
obligation to truth and against error (and I do not mean just that the 
obligation can be over-ridden by other considerations), We should refor-
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mulate GRE so as to take account, for example, of the degree of momen-
tousness and liveness of the issue in question. However, since I believe 
that GRE reformulated should apply to the issue under discussion, the 
reformulation need not delay us. We will pretend it has been successful-
ly accomplished. 
GRE, though, is not, a rule of epistemology. (It seems that Basinger 
would agree with this.) We mean the rules of epistemology to provide 
substantive directives on how to go about implementing the meta-rule, 
if you like, GRE. GRE gives no clue as to how one is to go about maxi-
mizing truth and avoiding error. That's where epistemology comes in. A 
rule-epistemology says that the way to implement GRE is to follow cer-
tain rules. It is rules that give substance to the meta-rule GRE. A religious 
epistemology says that it is not only rules that do this, but also some reli-
gious beliefs. That is to say, a religious epistemology will take it as rock 
bottom that there is a religious belief, R, such that if you want to make 
sure you are maximizing truth and avoiding error, make sure your 
belief is consistent with R. 
What, though, of my claim that a religious epistemology can consider R 
to be epistemically prior to all rules of rationality? Does GRE not yield 
the Consistency Rule? Indeed, GRE, by itself, does not yield the 
Consistency Rule. To see this, note that GRE says nothing about the rele-
vant weight to give to gaining truth as opposed to avoiding error. Now, 
suppose I wish to follow GRE and also believe that it's far more impor-
tant to maximize truth than to avoid error. I am willing to risk error for 
the possibility of gaining truth. In addition, I am willing to hold a false 
belief, everything else being equal, if that is the only way to guarantee 
me a true one. Then, suppose, after careful consideration I have no idea 
whether p is true or false. Since I value believing truly over the avoid-
ance of error there will be at least some cases where the most rational 
thing for me to do would be to hook myself up to a machine which will 
induce in me both a belief that p and a belief that not-p, preferably so as 
to prevent the two beliefs from meeting in my mind. True enough, that 
way I will not get full benefit from my true belief (whichever it is) in 
having it influence my behavior and responses, since it must share my 
(split) attention with a contradictory false belief (whichever it is). 
However, I am a lover of truth, and am willing to be guided by the truth 
(whichever it is) at least part of the time at the price of being guided by 
the false (whichever it is) at other times. Admittedly, this is not too prac-
tical a stance when the belief in p or in not-p is quite relevant to my life. 
But otherwise it suits me fine. (Of course, I will also have to deny that I 
have an obligation to believe, on appropriate occasions, what follows 
from the conjunction of my beliefs. However, this denial need extend 
only as far as the accommodation of false beliefs in cases similar to the 
above.) 
So GRE by itself, does not yield the Consistency Rule. To get the latter 
from GRE we would have to formulate GRE so that it excludes gaining a 
true belief at the price of gaining a false belief. We do, though, normally 
endorse the Consistency Rule. We do so, I imagine, because we have an 
in-principle aversion to believing falsely. Also, we think that we should 
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believe, on appropriate occasions, what follows from the conjunction of 
our beliefs. (There is also the fact that given human psychology, believ-
ing not-p might interfere with believing p, and vice versa. So a false 
belief might harm a true belief.) So I am not adverse to reformulating 
GRE accordingly. 
So let's pretend now that we have once more reformulated GRE so as 
to make me happy, so as to rule out gaining truth at the price of gaining 
falsity. Then the Consistency Rule is a direct logical consequence of 
GRE. No one could violate the Consistency Rule without being in direct 
violation of GRE. And I would quite agree that the religious epistemologist 
is committed to the Consistency Rule. She uses it, for example, when she 
rejects any belief inconsistent with her cherished religious belief. 
So I do agree that the religious epistemologist is committed to the meta-
rule GRE and to its logical consequences. This much the religious episte-
mologist is committed to insofar as she has an epistemology at all. 
So I should not have said in my article that for the religious episte-
mologist her religious belief could be prior to all rules of rationality. Her 
religious belief is not prior to GRE and its logical consequences. 
However, I consider GRE and its logical consequences to be meta-episte-
mological rules and not epistemological rules proper. The latter are not 
logical consequences of GRE but substantive directives for fulfilling 
GRE. So what I should have said, and now do say, is that a religious 
belief can be prior to all epistemological rules proper. From now on this is 
what I shall mean by saying a religious belief can be "strongly prior" in 
a believer's epistemology. Hence, in particular it can be prior to 
Basinger's Rule that one has an obligation to attempt to resolve epis-
temic peer conflict. 
Isn't it just self-evident, though, that if one is bound to maximize 
truth and minimize error that one simply must at least try to resolve the 
epistemic peer conflict of religious diversity? Doesn't Basinger's Rule 
follow logically from GRE as much as does the Consistency Rule? Well, 
no. It would be self-evident only if truth were an open question. Then in 
order to maximize truth and minimize error one should at least try to 
adjudicate the conflict. But if one already has the truth the attempt to 
find the truth would be superfluous. It is the mark of what I am calling a 
"religious epistemology" that it takes certain religious propositions, and 
not just rules, as epistemically rock-bottom and strongly prior. So it 
maintains right from the start that it has the truth. In that case, it need 
not attempt to resolve the peer conflict. If the strongly prior belief that 
one has the truth in R can be conjoined to GRE to neutralize Basinger's 
Rule, then Basinger's Rule is not a logical consequence of GRE. 
The situation of a believer facing religious diversity is no worse than 
that of the same believer who comes across what seems to be a sound 
proof that her favored religious belief is false. In the latter instance, she 
could do a G.E. Moore Switch and conclude, in light of her religious belief, 
that the proof though it seemed sound was not, and that there must be 
something wrong with it somewhere, she knows not what nor where. She 
might even believe her faith was being tested to see whether she would 
submit to the temptations of rule epistemology or remain true to God." 
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A problem with my position does arise: if religious belief can be rock-
bottom and prior to all epistemic rules, then by the same token cannot 
any crazy fantasy enjoy the same status? In my previous article I dealt 
with this problem at length. I will not repeat here what I wrote there.9 
Until now I have not addressed Basinger's Rule that one has a prima 
facie obligation to "attempt to resolve pervasive epistemic peer conflict." 
I do not think Basinger's Rule is true in general. Why should the mere 
fact that others happen to hold a position in conflict with mine place 
upon me a (prima facie) obligation to try to find evidence that would 
resolve the conflict? I should think that I have such an obligation only 
when I have at least some reason for thinking they have some justifica-
tion for their belief, justification that might render my belief untenable 
or that weakens it. Otherwise, why should I bother with what "they" 
say? So I would prefer a rule that goes something like this: "A person S 
has a prima facie obligation to try to resolve epistemic peer conflict 
when the conflict is live and momentous for S and when S has reason to 
think that the opposing epistemic agents in the conflict have or might 
have some justification for their belief that renders S's belief untenable 
or weakens it."lo 
How does the "religious epistemologist" fare with religious diversity 
on this rule relative to a rock-bottom strongly prior religious belief, R? 
For her, R is prior to all epistemic rules. Recall that to say this is to say 
she accepts the application of R regardless of the results of applying 
these rules, that is, she does not allow the results of applying an episte-
mological rule to affect her accepting the result of applying R. (In this 
regard R functions for her as does the Consistency Rule.) Recall that she 
"applies" R when she rejects a result inconsistent with it. Since R is 
strongly prior for her, R gives her good reason to believe that the oppos-
ing view is false. So why should she be obligated (prima facie) to engage 
the opposing view? After all, the holders of that view are reasoning 
without the benefit of R. So even if they were to have evidence contrary 
to R, which might include what is for them a rock bottom strongly prior 
religious belief R', she has reason to believe it could not be decisive 
against R. She has good reason not to engage in what Basinger calls 
"positive apologetics," trying to find evidence that will favor Rover R'. 
Suppose, though, we adopted a Principle of Charity to the effect that 
when there is pervasive epistemic peer conflict we should assume, 
everything else being equal, that the other side has some justification. So 
in practical terms, Basinger Rule's would be correct. Or suppose I am 
just wrong in rejecting Basinger's Rule. And suppose I am wrong about 
the standing of the Consistency Rule. Suppose, against my denial, we 
should regard it as an epistemological rule. What if Basinger was to con-
tend then that since the claim that justified, rock bottom religious beliefs 
need not satisfy any epistemological rules is not true, no valid challenge 
has been made to his position? Would this be a good response? It would 
be to that claim. However, contrary to the way I have been arguing until 
now, the believer need not derive the priority of R to Basinger's Rule 
from its priority to all epistemological rules. She could derive it instead 
from a rule that R is to be prior to a rule, E, if and only if the violation of 
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E does not entail her gaining a false belief. This rule reflects the degree of 
R's strength in her epistemology, and grants a status to the Consistency 
Rule similar to that of R there: to believe "against" R too entails believ-
ing a falsehood. Since the violation of the Consistency Rule does entail 
gaining a false belief, R is not prior to it. Since the violation of Basinger's 
Rule does not entail gaining a false belief, R is prior to it. 
So the believer can be portrayed as having an epistemological general-
ization that lets in the Consistency Rule and keeps out Basinger's RuleY 
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NOTES 
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gratefulness to God for granting her the gift of true faith. 
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